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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
decision to allocate the gross receipts, was actually less than it would have
been had the proper classification been applied to the receipts without alloca-
tion. This allocation by the comptroller, while lawful, was not required.
They held that the two classifications were relevant only in determining
the ceiling on the amount of the one tax which could be imposed. This dis-
senting opinion maintained that there was nothing to litigate unless the tax
had been improperly assessed in an amount in excess of that authorized by the
enabling legislation.39
The majority opinion indicated that where the classification is improper,
the constitutional question is reached and it refused to consider whether or not
the comptroller's determination could be upheld on the broader grounds in-
troduced by the minority opinion.
The dissent cited the federal case of Lewis v. Reynolds,40 wherein a re-
fund was claimed for a tax paid to the Internal Revenue Department. The fact
situation there arose out of a tax determination negating the petitioner's claim
of over-payment and the effect of the statute of limitations as a bar to a new
assessment. The minority noted that the refund there was denied because it
was held that even though no new assessment could be made after the statute
had run, the tax-payer, nevertheless, was not entitled to a refund because he
had failed to show that he had over-paid his tax. The analogy applicable to
the instant case is found in the plaintiff's failure to show that the comptroller
could not levy the tax without allocation.
To support this supposition that allocation was not required by the de-
fendant, the minority noted the decision in Steinbeck v. Gerosa,41 which held
that even though the petitioner's business activities may induce or occasion
interstate commerce, the relationship must be a close and direct one to escape
the gross receipts tax. There the petitioner received royalties, from out of state
publishers under contracts negotiated in New York. That court held that the
payment did not directly result from interstate commerce.
The apparent analogy drawn by the dissent was that United States Steel,
as a holding company by the nature of its supervisory and financing role, was
doing business which was distinguishable from the direct operations of its
subsidiaries outside of the state. The likening of the petitioner and his pub-
lishers in the Steinbeck case as being more akin to a creditor and debtor than
to a partnership or joint venture seemed to suggest a further application of
this reasoning by the dissent to the holding company and its subsidiaries.
APPLICATION OF SECTIONS 86-A AND 87(2) OF THE Mum mzSH CORPoPATI N
LAW To EXISTING CONTRACTS
In 1910, the Grove Hill Realty Co. sold and conveyed certain land to the
Femcliff Cemetery Association. The parties entered into an agreement wherein
39. Nash v. Lynch, 253 N.Y. 564, 171 N.E. 784 (1930).
40. 284 US. 281 (1931).
41. 4 N.Y.2d 302, 175 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1958).
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it was agreed, that in consideration of the said conveyance, Ferncliff would pay
to Grove Hill one-half of the proceeds from each sale of burial plots to the
public. This agreement was carried out for a number of years until the Ceme-
tery Board of the State of New York notified Ferncliff, that by reason of an
amendment to Section 87 of the Membership Corporation Law and the enact-
ment of a new section, namely Section 86-a to the Membership Corporation
Law, both effective September 1, 1949, it would be illegal for the parties to
continue the mode of payment under the 1910 agreement. 42 The Cemetery
Board stated that by virtue of Sections 86-a and 87(2), it was necessary for
Ferncliff to maintain (1) a "permanent maintenance fund" into which must
be deposited not less than 10%o of the gross proceeds of any sale of a burial
plot, and (2) a "current maintenance fund" into which must also be deposited
an additional 15%o of such gross proceeds. Under this ruling, Grove Hill would
only be entitled to receive one-half of the net proceeds remaining after the
sales price had been reduced by the deposits for the two funds.
Grove Hill instituted an action in which it attacked the interpretation
given to Sections 86-a and 87(2) of the Membership Corporation Law by the
Cemetery Board, claiming that such interpretation unconstitutionally impaired
the obligation of the contract between Grove Hill and Ferncliff, and also de-
prived it of its property without due process of law. The lower court found
for the defendant Board and FernCliff.43 On appeal, the Appellate Division,
44
and the Court of Appeals,4 5 in a 4-3 decision, affirmed, holding that Sections
86-a and 87(2) of the Membership Corporation Law were valid and consti-
tutional in so far as they affected the agreement between Grove Hill and
Ferncliff.
Even though Grove Hill's rights as to payment are reduced by the appli-
cation of Section 87(2), it does not follow that it is unconstitutional as to
Grove Hill. The courts must determine whether the right of private contract
42. § 86-a:
(1) Every cemetery corporation shall maintain and preserve the cemetery, in-
cluding all lots, plots and parts thereof. For the sole purpose of such maintenance
and preservation, every cemetery corporation shall establish and maintain (a) a
permanent maintenance fund; and (b) a current maintenance fund. At the time of
making sale of a lot, plot or part thereof, the cemetery corporation shall deposit
not less than 10 per centum of the gross proceeds of the sale into the permanent
maintenance fund. An additional 159o/ of the gross proceeds of the sale shall be
deposited in the current maintenance fund.
Section 87(2):
"Where a corporation has agreed with a person from whom any such lands were
purchased to pay therefor a specified share not exceeding Y of the proceeds of
sales of lots therein or the use thereof, such corporation may continue to make
payments as so agreed, provided however that there be first deducted from said
proceeds of sales the amount required to be deposited in the permanent nzainte-
nance fund and current maintenance fund as aforesaid together with the expenses
of sale" (Emphasis supplied.)
43. Grove Hill Realty Co. v. Ferncliff Cemetery Assoc. 9 Misc. 2d 47, 167 N.Y.S.2d
675 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
44. 7 A.D.2d 736, 180 N.Y.S.2d 767 (2d Dep't 1958).
45. 7 N.Y.2d 403, 198 N.Y.S.2d 287 (1960).
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has been unduly interfered with and this must be done on the basis of each
individual fact situation.4 6 Neither property rights nor contract rights are
absolute, and both must give way to a proper exercise of police power.
47 If
police regulation is necessary to preserve the welfare of the public, the only
requirement is that the limit placed on the contract rest on some reasonable
basis and not be arbitrarily exercised.48
As a public corporation, Ferncliff was particularly amendable to the
exercise of the police power of the State where, as here, it was necessary to
assure purchasers of burial lots of adequate maintenance. In New York, funds
derived from the sale of cemetery lots are regarded as dedicated to a public
use and held in trust and their disposal is subject to statutory regulation under
the State's police power.
49
The interdiction of statutes impairing the obligations of contract does not
prevent the state from exercising such powers as are vested in it for the pro-
motion of the common weal, or are necessary for the good of the public; though
contracts previously entered into between individuals may thereby be affected.50
"The question is not whether the legislative action affects contracts incidentally,
or directly, or indirectly, but whether the legislation is addressed to a legitimate
end and the measures taken are reasonable and appropriate to that end."'
The principal evil sought to be corrected by Sections 86-a and 87(2) was
the misuse of funds by cemetery corporations, including their failure to apply
a sufficient portion of the sales proceeds towards preserving and maintaining
the cemetery. Certainly it can be said the setting up and prior deductibility
of the maintenance funds were reasonably related to the evils to be overcome.
On the other hand, the dissent felt that to construe the statute as the
majority did would clearly render it unconstitutional. "Reducing plaintiff's
contractual share in the sales proceeds from 50% of 100% to 50% of 75% is
pure confiscation; it has no relation to the evil sought to be cured and is,
therefore, not a proper exercise of the police power."152
There would appear to be merit in this argument. Since the principal evil
sought to be remedied was the misuse of funds by the cemetery corporations,
including their failure to apply a sufficient portion of the 50% sales proceeds
retained towards preserving and maintaining the cemetery. The majority's
holding puts one-half of this burden on the person selling the land to the
cemetery association; a burden which does not seem to have been intended by
the Legislature.
46. Erie Ry. Co. v. Williams, 233 U.S. 685 (1914).
47. Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905).
48. Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1 (1927).
49. Matter of Lyons Cemetery Assoc., 93 App. Div. 19, 86 N.Y. Supp. 960 (4th Dep't
1904); Whittemore v. Woodlawn Cemetery, 71 App. Div. 257, 75 N.Y. Supp. 847 (1st Dep't
1902); Matter of Norton, 97 Misc. 289, 161 N.Y. Supp. 710 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
So. Supra note 47.
51. Matter of People (Tit. & Mtge. Guar. Co.), 264 N.Y. 69, 83, 190 N.E. 153, 157
(1934).
52. Supra note 45 at 414, 198 N.Y.S.2d 296 (1960).
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Under the dissent's interpretation, the plaintiff should receive 50%o of
the original sales proceeds, and the 25o to be deducted should be taken entirely
from the cemetery association's share, for it is they who should have the entire
burden of maintenance of the cemetery.
However, if this were to be so, the phrase from Section 87(2), "provided
however that there be first deducted from said proceeds ..." would have no
meaning. Thus, it can be said that in reading the Section in its entirety, the
Legislature did intend to put part of the burden of maintenance on- the seller
and that in order to give effect to all the words of the section, the 25o is to
first be deducted before any shares are made and that the seller's 50% is to
be that of .75% rather than 100%.
STATUTES CERTIFYING PSYCHOLOGISTS HELD VALID
In an action for declaratory judgment as to the validity of Article 153
of the New York Education Law, 3 a statute which provides for the certification
of all those who use the title "psychologist" or its derivatives, the validity of
the law was upheld through the courts from Special Term,54 to the Appellate
Division,55 to the Court of Appeals in National Psychological Association for
Psychoanalysis, Inc. v. University of the State of New York. 6
This statute was passed to protect the public from unscrupulous or un-
qualified people who attempt to cash in on the public's confidence in psychology
or who profess to be skilled in applying its theories.r
The statute is a certifying law rather than a licensing law. It does not
prohibit anyone from rendering psychological services, but rather prohibits
anyone not certified from accepting money while holding himself out to be a
psychologist. By establishing a certification procedure, the Legislature hoped
to protect the public against charlatans and quacks who, despite inadequate
training and professional experience, guarantee easy solutions to psychological
problems.
The Legislature has in the past regulated and protected certain profes-
sions with licensing laws, e.g., lawyers and medical doctors, or with certifying
laws, e.g., accountants, plumbers, architects.58
Plaintiffs real objection to this statute was the fact that the University
of the State of New York in administering the statute refused to certify certain
graduates of European colleges whom the Association wished to be certified.
53. §§ 7601-7617.
54. 18 Misc. 2d 722, 188 N.YS.2d 151 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
55. 10 A.D.2d 688, 199 N.YS.2d 423 (1st Dep't 1960).
56. 8 N.Y.2d 197, 203 N.Y.S.2d 821 (1960).
57. For an interesting discussion of the selling power of the term "psychologist"
and its use by non-professionals see Note, Regulation of Psychological Counseling and
Psychotherapy, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 474 (1951).
58. Roth v. Hoster Realty Co., 119 Misc. 686, 197 N.Y. Supp. 220 (Sup. Ct. 1922),
commented that what is now N.Y. Education Law §§ 7301-7307 was directed solely against
the assumption of the title architect or registered architect and did not forbid the practice
of the profession or occupation generally.
